Between data and theory

In the philosophy of science, people like professor Woodward have argued that there is more than just inference from data to theory or prediction from theory to data. They allow for an intermediary, the phenomenon. This perspective in philosophy of science recognizes phenomena as the explanatory targets of theories and they characterize phenomena as stable empirical features that can be consistently inferred from data. Although this perspective makes intuitive sense and adds valuable nuance to the cycle of scientific inference, it has remained unknown in psychological science.

Putting phenomena into practice

During this one-day workshop, the participants discussed how to introduce ‘the phenomenon’ to psychological science. Topics included the characterization of phenomena, how they are identified and established, and how they should be stored and communicated. Including phenomena in the conceptual repertoire of psychological science puts replication, validity, reliability, generalizability, and the value of novel findings in a new light. The outcomes of this workshop are intended to be transcribed and submitted for publication.